Lists of Unprotected Categories

Chaplinsky:
"There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words -- those which, by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."

Stevens:
"These 'historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar,' including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct."

Brown:
"These limited areas—such as obscenity, incitement, and fighting words—represent 'well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.'"

Alvarez:
Instead, content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted only when confined to the few "historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar." Among these categories are advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called "fighting words," child pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent, although a restriction under the last category is most difficult to sustain. These categories have a historical foundation in the Court's free speech tradition. The vast realm of free speech always protected in our tradition can still thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence to those categories and rules.