Sample Exam Questions Covering:
Commerce Clause, Spending Power, State Autonomy (Tenth Amendment),
Dormant Commerce Clause, Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, and Preemption
Sample Exam Question One -
Commerce Clause Issue (NOTE: This is not the same question that is
answered as part of the 2004 Model Answer. That question does not
limit your reply to a single issue, but asks you to discuss all
relevant constitutional issues.)
The members of Congress have become alarmed at the increasing
popularity of cosmetic surgery in the United States. Over the last five
years, there has been a 400 percent increase in the number of cosmetic
surgery procedures performed in the United States. While some of these
involve relatively minor treatments, others involve major amounts of
expensive reconstruction of the face and body. Congress has concluded
that this trend has been fueled by the fact that we are increasingly a
society that worships youth and youthful appearance, by the popularity
of television shows such as Extreme Makeover and by the aging of the
baby boom generation. However, among the more surprising trends
identified by Congress is the fact that the percentage increase in
cosmetic surgery is just as high among people between 20 and 30 as it
is among those who are over 50.
The boom in cosmetic surgery procedures has been an enormous economic
benefit to the cosmetic surgery industry. This includes physicians,
hospitals, day clinics where many minor procedures are performed, drug
companies, makers of devices such as implants, to name some. In its
investigation, Congress learned that cosmetic surgery is a relatively
unregulated part of the health care industry. There is no special
certification for physicians in cosmetic surgery. Therefore, physicians
who have been certified in any field, no matter how unrelated to
cosmetic surgery, can perform cosmetic surgery procedures. Moreover,
there are no waiting periods or any other checks on the decision to
completely change one’s appearance through surgical procedures.
In order to deal with some of the excesses that have occurred, Congress
enacted the Federal Cosmetic Surgery Protection Act (FCSPA). The
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is
charged with the enforcement of FCSPA. Under the statute, a person is
not permitted to undergo a major cosmetic surgery procedure, except
where necessary for the physical health of the person or to correct a
major physical abnormality that interferes with normal appearance,
unless approved by a Cosmetic Surgery Approval (CSA) Panel created at
each facility licensed to perform cosmetic surgery. The statute does
not apply to minor procedures that can be performed in a physician’s
office such as Botox injections.
The CSA Panel shall consist of 3 physicians and a patient advocate.
Three of the four Panel members must vote to approve a cosmetic surgery
request for it to proceed. Patients whose requests are denied may ask
for reconsideration of the decision and, if unsuccessful, may seek
judicial review.
Adam Audrey is a 25 year old man from Gary, Indiana who wishes to
undergo extensive plastic surgery to change his appearance. He is
seeking a nose job, chin and cheek implants, and an eye lift. Since
childhood Mr. Audrey has been unhappy with his looks and was often
ridiculed by other children because of his appearance. Mr. Audrey hopes
the cosmetic surgery will help him to more fully enjoy life because he
will no longer be uncomfortable with social interactions.
Mr. Audrey consulted with a reputable cosmetic surgeon in Chicago,
Illinois. The surgeon agreed to perform the procedures he requested. As
required, the surgeon submitted Mr. Audrey’s request to the CSA Panel
at the Chicago medical facility where the surgery was to be performed.
After reviewing his case, the Panel rejected Mr. Audrey’s request on
the ground that the planned surgery was extensive and unnecessary for
someone of Mr. Audrey’s appearance, which the Panel considered to be
within the range of average for men of his age.
Mr. Audrey is very upset that his request to proceed with cosmetic
surgery was denied. He believes that a decision to have the surgery is
one he should be permitted to make free of federal government
involvement. After consulting a lawyer, he filed suit against the
Secretary of HHS to challenge the constitutionality of the Federal
Cosmetic Surgery Protection Act. Mr. Audrey is arguing that the federal
government lacks power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Federal
Cosmetic Surgery Protection Act (FCSPA).
You are a law clerk to the judge assigned to the case. The judge asks
you to write an analysis of the Commerce Clause arguments that can be
made by Adam Audrey in challenging the constitutionality of FCSPA as
well as the Commerce Clause arguments that can be made by the Secretary
of HHS in defending the constitutionality of the statute.
Sample Exam Question Two -
Preemption and Dormant Commerce Clause Issues (from Fall 2005 Exam -
Question I)
(Suggested time: 60 minutes) (50 out of 150 total exam points)
Seafood World, Inc. (SW), is a corporation with its headquarters in
Alabama. It imports seafood and sells its imported seafood to
restaurants and specialty fish markets throughout the United States.
One of its most popular products is a catfish grown in China.
Approximately 40 percent of SW’s Chinese-grown catfish are sold to
restaurants in Louisiana, mainly in Baton Rouge, 40 percent are sold to
restaurants in other states and 20 percent are sold to speciality fish
markets. None of the specialty fish markets are located in Louisiana.
SW’s labels designate the package contents as “catfish.” The phrase
“Cajun Boy” is written in large lettering to the left of “catfish.” The
phrase “Product of China” is located immediately below SW’s Alabama
address. According to SW, Chinese-grown catfish are members of the
family Ictaluridae and are biologically identical to domestic catfish
that belong to that same family. SW asserts that its Chinese-grown
catfish are direct descendants of Alabama catfish.
SW’s principal competitors are catfish farms located in Alabama,
Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi. Raising catfish in the controlled
environment of catfish farms became popular in the United States after
U.S. catfish waters became overfished and the catfish supply became
seriously depleted. Farm-raised catfish now account for 95 percent of
the U.S. catfish supply. The costs of raising catfish on catfish farms
exceeds the costs of SW’s imported variety of catfish. The U.S. catfish
industry has unsuccessfully lobbied the federal government to ban the
importation of catfish or at least impose an import tariff on imported
catfish that would bring the price of imported catfish in line with
U.S. catfish. Louisiana catfish farmers played a leading role in that
failed effort.
Fifteen months ago, SW received notification from the Louisiana
Department of Agriculture (LDA) that its catfish labels violated the
Louisiana Food Misrepresentation Law (LFML), a law designed to protect
consumers. The law provides as follows:
No one shall misrepresent the name, or type of any fruit, vegetable,
grain, meat, or fish, including catfish, sold or offered or exposed for
sale, to any actual or prospective customer.
Various subsections of the law identify particular instances of
misrepresentation including subsection (e):
(e) “Catfish” shall mean only those species within the family
Ictaluridae that are grown in the United States of America.
In response to the LDA notification, SW informed the LDA that it
believed its catfish labels were accurate and that they fully complied
with federal labeling requirements that prohibit misbranding. Under the
section of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that regulates
catfish: “A food shall be deemed to be misbranded ... if it purports to
be or is represented as catfish, unless it is fish classified within
the family Ictaluridae,” 21 U.S.C. § 343(t). SW argued, and the
LDA
does not dispute, that since all the catfish SW sells in Louisiana are
members of the family Ictaluridae, they are not misbranded under
federal law. Moreover, SW argued that its product labels include the
phrase “Product of China,” thereby making clear they are not domestic
catfish.
Despite SW’s arguments, the LDA informed SW that state law requires its
catfish to be re-labeled so as to comply with the LFML. The LDA told SW
that labeling its product as “Chinese Catfish” or “Imported Catfish”
would satisfy state law. Since the purpose of the statute is to avoid
giving food purchasers an inaccurate impression of the food product
they are buying, these changes would avoid inaccuracy. The LDA asserted
that the typical purchaser of catfish assumes that catfish is a product
of the United States, particularly grown in Louisiana, Mississippi,
Arkansas and Alabama. Therefore, the product name of imported catfish
must make clear that it does not originate in the United States in
order to avoid misrepresenting the nature of the catfish. It further
argued that it was free to impose additional labeling requirements on
catfish because the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act provides that
“States may impose additional labeling requirements on products
regulated by this Act so long as those requirements would not
contribute to consumer confusion. States are not free to prohibit
labeling information required by this Act.” In light of these facts,
the LDA ordered SW to immediately cease selling its catfish in
Louisiana with its current label.
One year ago, SW filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
the LFML. In its suit, SW argues both that the Louisiana catfish
labeling requirement is preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and that it violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. In order
to continue selling catfish in Louisiana during the pendency of its
lawsuit, it altered the label it used on all of the catfish sold in
Louisiana so that the label reads “Imported Catfish.” Thus far, the
need to separately label catfish destined for Louisiana has added
$250,000 to SW’s production costs and its catfish sales had dropped by
25 percent even prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
You are a law clerk to the judge assigned to the case. The judge asks
you to write an analysis of the preemption and Dormant Commerce Clause
arguments available to Seafood World in challenging the Louisiana Food
Misrepresentation Law as well as the arguments available to the LDA in
defending the LFML against those constitutional challenges.
Sample Exam Question Three -
Commerce Clause and State Autonomy (Tenth Amendment) Issues (from
Spring 2007 Exam - Question III)
(Suggested time: 60 minutes) (50 out of 150 total exam points)
The federal government has become increasingly concerned that genetic
testing is being used by employers to discriminate against those whose
tests reveal genetic predispositions to certain conditions. In order to
outlaw this form of discrimination, Congress enacted the Genetic
Discrimination in Employment Act of 2007 (GDEA). Under the terms of
GDEA, employers may not consider the results of genetic testing in
making employment decisions.
Under GDEA, an employer is required to comply with its provisions if
the employer “employs 5 or more employees.” The nature of the
employer’s business is not taken into account in determining whether an
employer is covered by the Act. In addition, states and their
subdivisions also qualify as employers under the provisions of GDEA and
are subject to its restrictions. Moreover, states must report to the
federal government any credible information they receive that GDEA has
been violated.
Before enacting GDEA, Congress heard testimony from individuals who
were discriminated against in employment because of the results of
genetic testing. For example, several women testified that they had
been refused a promotion because genetic testing disclosed an enhanced
susceptibility for breast cancer and their employers were unwilling to
promote them because of fear they might become ill. Congress also heard
from individuals who were refused employment because they carried the
gene for Huntington’s Disease, a degenerative disorder of the central
nervous system.
Representatives from a variety of state agencies also testified. They
argued that they should be permitted to take the results of genetic
testing into account in choosing who to employ. For example, the head
of a special undercover law enforcement task force testified that his
task force had refused to employ persons with a genetic marker for a
rare condition that reduces a person’s inhibitions. The employment of
such persons, the task force head argued, would present a security risk
to the safety of undercover operatives. In their testimony, state
officials also objected to the reporting requirements of GDEA.
Shortly after the enactment of GDEA, it was challenged by a coalition
of states and private employers who are subject to its provisions. The
states argue that the law violates their state autonomy rights under
the Tenth Amendment and the private employers argue that the law
exceeds the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to regulate the
employment relationship.
You are a law clerk to the judge assigned to the case. The judge asks
you to analyze the Tenth Amendment (state autonomy) and Commerce Clause
arguments that can be made to challenge the constitutionality of GDEA
as well as the arguments that the federal government can make in
defending the constitutionality of GDEA on Tenth Amendment and Commerce
Clause grounds.
Sample Exam Question Four (from
Spring 2009 - Question I)
(Suggested time: 60 minutes) (48 out of 144 total exam points)
In 2008, the City of Springdale passed an ordinance that regulates tow
trucks. The Springdale City Council held hearings before the ordinance
was enacted. The presidents of several local towing businesses
testified that a growing number of tow trucks, many from outside
Springdale, were monitoring Springdale police radio transmissions and
“racing” each other to be the first to reach the scene of a car
accident. A month before the ordinance was enacted, two tow trucks
operated by towing businesses located outside of Springdale collided
and killed a driver whose car had been in an accident in Springdale and
needed to be towed. Springdale is located in the western part of
Massachusetts near the border that separates Massachusetts from
Connecticut.
The ordinance makes it unlawful to “engage in towing in the City of
Springdale without having first obtained a license from the Springdale
Tow Truck Licensing Authority.” The ordinance defines “towing” to
include not only the towing of a vehicle, but any “driving or other
operation of a tow truck, or the offering to transport a vehicle by
means of a tow truck.” Thus, the ordinance requires that all tow trucks
within the City limits must be licensed by the City. This is true
regardless of whether the truck has a vehicle in tow and regardless of
whether the truck is actively soliciting business in the City or simply
passing through, such as towing a car from one location outside the
City to another location outside the City.
In order to obtain a tow truck license from the Licensing Authority, a
towing business, wherever located, must pay annual fees of $ 600 per
truck and $ 20 per driver. As part of the licensing process, tow trucks
must undergo a vehicle inspection and drivers must submit to a criminal
record check. Further, applicants must furnish proof of adequate
liability insurance. Because the licensing process often takes up to
six months, single-tow emergency licenses can be issued by any police
officer after a brief vehicle inspection for a fee of $50. No towing
business can receive more than four single-tow emergency licenses
within any one calendar year.
Before enacting the ordinance, the Springdale City Council consulted
with the City Attorney to see if a local towing ordinance would violate
federal law. The City Attorney informed the City Council that a
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act prevents states and local
governments from enacting laws “related to the price, route, or service
of any motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property.”
While this federal law applies to towing, a form of transportation of
property, it contains an exception which provides that the provision
“shall not restrict the regulatory authority of a State with respect to
the safety of motor vehicles.” The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted this exception to only apply to local regulations
“genuinely responsive to safety concerns.” The City Attorney offered
his opinion that this exception might apply to the Springdale towing
ordinance. After hearing this legal advice, the City Counsel went ahead
and enacted the ordinance.
Tony Tower (TT) resides in Connecticut. TT operates a towing business
in Connecticut, but is sometimes called to tow cars located in
Springdale and on occasion transports a vehicle through Springdale on
his way to locations in other states. He has filed a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the Springdale towing ordinance.
You are a law clerk for the judge assigned to the case. The judge has
asked you to write an analysis of the constitutional arguments that
Tony Tower can make in challenging the constitutionality of the
Springdale towing ordinance as well as the arguments that the City of
Springdale can make in defense of the constitutionality of the
ordinance.
Sample Exam Question Five (from
Spring 1993 Exam - Question I)
(Suggested time: 60 minutes) (40 out of 120 total exam points)
The State of Connecticut recently enacted the Small Parts Labeling
Law. The law requires that toy manufacturers place conspicuous
warning labels on toys designed for children between the ages of three
and seven that pose a danger to children under the age of three of
choking, aspiration or ingestion because of small parts. The law
forbids the sale of any such toy in the State of Connecticut that does
not include a required warning label.
When the law was first proposed, Connecticut held hearings on the
law. It heard testimony from medical experts who testified that
choking on small parts is one of the leading causes of toy-related
death for children under age three. It also heard testimony from
the President of Safe Toys, Inc., the only manufacturer of toys for
children between the ages of three and seven located in
Connecticut. Safe Toys was a major supporter of the law, arguing
that the safety of children should always be a priority for the
government. Under questioning, the President of Safe Toys made
clear that the new law would have no adverse effect on Safe Toys, Inc.
because few of its toys contained any dangerous small parts and the few
that did already contained explicit warning labels.
Before enacting the Small Parts Labeling Law, Connecticut considered
the provisions of the Federal Toy Safety Act of 1980. Under this
Act, toys may not be shipped in interstate commerce if they are
intended for use by children under three years of age and they present
(1) an electrical, mechanical or thermal hazard to such children or (2)
a risk of choking, aspiration or ingestion because of small
parts. In addition, warning labels are required on toys that are
intended for children between the ages of three and seven if those toys
pose an electrical, mechanical or thermal hazard to children under age
three. In 1983, Congress considered an amendment to the Toy
Safety Act that would have extended the warning label requirement to
toys intended for children between the ages of three and seven if those
toys pose a risk of choking, aspiration or ingestion because of small
parts to children under age three. The amendment was defeated.
Children's Toys, Inc., an Ohio corporation, is a major manufacturer of
toys for children between the ages of three and seven. Its most
profitable line of toys are sets of plastic blocks that can be linked
together. Many of the individual parts in the sets would pose a
small parts hazard to children under the age of three. However,
all of the toys manufactured by Children's Toys carry labels informing
purchasers that the toys are designed for children between the ages of
three and seven and are, therefore, in compliance with the Federal Toy
Safety Act.
Children's Toys has filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality
of the Connecticut Small Parts Labeling Law. Children's Toys
argues that it is in compliance with the Federal Toy Safety Act and
that the State of Connecticut's effort to impose a labeling requirement
on it is unconstitutional. In addition, it argues that since
Children's Toys sells its products nationwide, the Connecticut Law
imposes a burden on its interstate activities. Moreover,
Children's Toys claims that the Connecticut law was designed to benefit
one of its chief competitors, Safe Toys, Inc.
The State of Connecticut defends its Small Parts Labeling Law, in part,
by arguing that, despite the federal ban on unsafe toys intended for
use by children under three years of age, choking on small parts
continues to be one of the main causes of toy-related death for young
children. Therefore, it argues, a warning label requirement is
necessary because parents often interpret an age label on a toy (that
states, for example, "3-up") as no more than a suggestion regarding the
developmental level of the user without recognizing that the toy may
contain dangerous small parts.
You are a law clerk to the judge assigned to the case. The judge
asks you to write an analysis of the constitutional arguments that can
be made by Children's Toys, Inc. in claiming that the Small Parts
Labeling Law is unconstitutional as well as the arguments that can be
made by the State of Connecticut in defense of the law.
Sample Exam Question Six -
Privileges and Immunity Clause Issue (from Fall 2005 Exam - Question
III)
(Suggested time: 30 minutes) (25 out of 150 total exam points)
The Springdale Secondary is a 6.5-mile stretch of railroad
track that extends from
Barrington, Massachusetts to Hudson, Massachusetts. The railroad
property includes the railroad
track and station buildings at both ends. The Barrington end of the
Springdale Secondary is at an
interchange with a railroad line owned by CSX Transportation, an
interstate railroad carrying
freight throughout the eastern United States. CSX is not currently
operating any trains that travel
past the Barrington interchange. The Hudson end terminates in an
interchange with Norfolk
Southern, another interstate railroad freight carrier. Norfolk Southern
is not currently operating
any trains that travel past the Hudson interchange. Like many other
stretches of rail lines that
once provided the major means of passenger and freight transportation
for the nation, the
Springdale Secondary is in a state of disuse. Without connections to
any other operating rail
lines at either end, the Springdale Secondary has no current value as a
passenger or freight
railroad.
The current owner of the Springdale Secondary is the
Springdale Transit Authority for
Regional Travel (START), a transit authority created and operated by
the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. On December 30, 2004, START signed a lease agreement
that gave the Town of
Barrington the limited right to operate a rail passenger excursion and
dining service over the
Springdale Secondary. Barrington’s rail passenger excursion train was
to travel at a speed of no
faster than five miles per hour and would serve food and beverages and
provide entertainment in
the form of musical reviews, stand-up comedy, or murder/mystery/romance
productions.
Passengers would board the excursion train in Barrington,
Massachusetts, have dinner as the train
traveled to Hudson and back, and then disembark. The lease agreement
barred the Town of
Barrington from engaging in any freight or passenger services on the
Springfield Secondary other
than the excursion train described in the lease. Under the lease
agreement, the railroad excursion
train would begin and end within Massachusetts and would service
passengers with purely
intrastate ticketing and with no connection to interstate rail
passenger or freight services.
The excursion train became operational in May, 2005.
While the Town of Barrington
currently subsidizes the operation of the train, it hopes that over the
long term the train will
become a popular activity for both tourists and local residents and
will become self-supporting. Barrington charges $40 per person for its
dinner excursion and $25 for its lunch excursion. To
encourage passengers to try the train, the Town of Barrington provides
4 categories of discounted
prices including discounts for families with two or more children,
senior citizens, minor children
accompanied by an adult, and year-round residents of the Town of
Barrington.
A lawsuit was recently
brought against the Town of Barrington by David Dowd (DD). Mr. Dowd is
a resident of the State of New York who owns a summer home in the Town
of Barrington. He lives in his Barrington home during July and August
as well as occasional weekends during other parts of the year. He pays
real estate taxes to the town. In addition, he pays fees for water and
sewer service. Income from real estate taxes is the principal source of
revenue collected by the Town of Barrington.
Mr. Dowd has ridden the Barrington excursion train on several
occasions. Each time he requested the discount available for residents,
but was informed that the discount was only available to year-round
residents of Barrington and that he does not qualify since his legal
residence is in New York and he only resides in Barrington part of the
year, principally in the summer. DD does not dispute these facts.
However, his lawsuit argues that refusing to grant him the same
discount available to year-round residents violates his rights under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution: “The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States.”
You are a law clerk to the judge assigned to the case. The judge asks
you to write an analysis of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
arguments available to David Dowd in challenging the residency discount
as well as the Privileges and Immunities Clause arguments available to
the Town of Barrington in defending its residency discount.
Sample Exam Question Seven -
Commerce Clause and Spending Power Issues (from Spring 2009 Exam
Question II (questions 1 and 2 out of 7 subparts))
After reviewing a series of studies undertaken by the Department of
Education (DOE), academic literature, and expert testimony before
congressional committees, Congress is considering enacting the Single
Sex Educational Opportunity Act (SSEOA) of 2009. Under this federal
law, public and private elementary and middle schools (grades K-8) in
all 50 states would be required by the year 2012 to offer students in
underperforming, large enrollment schools a single sex alternative.
Such schools would be required to provide equal single sex educational
opportunities for males and females and would not be permitted to
displace classes where males and females are enrolled in the same
class. Under the statute, “large enrollment schools” are defined by
grade rather than by classifying the school in its entirety. Therefore,
schools offering K-8 education are only required to offer a single sex
alternative in any grade in which they have at least 6 classes in a
grade level. In that circumstance, there would be 4 coed classes and
one class for males and one for females. The statute gives schools some
discretion in how to select students for enrollment in single sex
classes if they are oversubscribed, but it requires that all such
enrollments be voluntary and with the express permission of the parents.
SSEOA was co-sponsored by several members of the House and Senate after
a number of studies demonstrated that both boys and girls, particularly
those who fail to perform at or above grade level on standardized
tests, show a marked increase in their academic performance if they are
placed in single sex classes. This improvement is most dramatic in
grades K-8 which is why SSEOA only applies to those grades. While the
improvement is more dramatic for boys, there is also some improvement
for girls as well. In light of declining high school graduation rates
and the need for a skilled workforce, members of Congress concluded
that a single sex alternative in the early grades should be part of the
effort to improve the American education system.
SSEOA mandates single sex classes be offered only in underperforming
schools. Underperforming schools are defined as schools in which
average standardized test scores are well below the national average
for each grade level. In addition to the mandatory provisions of SSEOA,
the statute also provides educational improvement grants to schools
with average performance on standardized tests on the condition that
they offer single sex alternatives for both male and female students.
While there is overwhelming support for SSEOA in Congress, some issues
remain to be resolved. You are a legislative aide to a member of
Congress who is involved in drafting the final version of the statute.
You have been asked to answer a series of specific legal questions
about SSEOA. In response, please include in your answer an analysis of
the arguments on both sides of the issues raised in these questions.
However, you do not need to argue both sides if there is only one
reasonable answer to the question.
1. Could SSEOA be successfully challenged as an unconstitutional
exercise of the Commerce Power?
2. Could the educational improvement grants awarded to public
schools with average performance on standardized tests on the condition
that they offer single sex alternatives for both male and female
students be successfully challenged as a violation of the Spending
Power?
Sample Exam Question Eight
The State of Midwest is worried about the plight of the family-owned
farm in its state. The number of such farms has been declining at
a
steady rate for a number of years. As part of a series of efforts
to
help the small farmer, the state has funded a program to set up
Farmer’s Markets in each of its three largest cities. Under the
program, the state has set up three Farmer’s Markets on land that it
owns. Seven days a week during the summer and fall, the state
allows
local farmers to sell their fresh fruits and vegetables from stands
provided in the market area. Space at the markets is provided at
no
cost to farmers who grow their produce on farmland within the
state.
To encourage buying at these markets, the state has funded a publicity
campaign about the Farmer’s Markets with the slogan, “Support your
local farmer - Shop at the Farmer’s Markets.”
Recently, a farmer who resides in the bordering State of Midsouth and
who grows fruits and vegetables on his farm in the State of Midsouth
asked to use space at one the of the Farmer’s Markets in Midwest to
sell his farm produce. He was turned down by the State of Midwest
on
the ground that his fruits and vegetables were not grown on farmland
located in the State of Midwest. After being turned down, the
farmer
brought a lawsuit claiming that the restriction was unconstitutional.
You are a law clerk to the judge assigned to the case. The judge
has
asked you to write an analysis of the arguments that can be made by the
farmer to support his claim that the restriction is unconstitutional as
well as the arguments that can be made by the State of Midwest in
support of the constitutionality of the farmer’s exclusion from the
Farmer’s Market.