This is Part Two
of a two-part review by Professor Leora Harpaz of the material covered
in my Internet Law course during the Spring, 2012 semester.
Internet Law Spring 2012 Review - Part Two
III. Trademark Law and the Internet (Chapter 3)
A. Challenging Registrations of Domain Names Under the Lanham Act
1. The registration of domain names sometimes raises classic trademark
issues such as whether there is a likelihood of confusion between a
registered domain name and a registered trademark.
In other situations, the issues are much more uniquely related to the
fact that the trademark conflict is between a trademark and a similar
domain name such as in cases where the behavior at issue is
cybersquatting or in cases where a First Amendment defense is raised
because the domain name is expressive.
2. In trademark/domain name disputes, the trademark holder can raise
claims under the traditional sections of the Lanham Act (Sections 32
and 43(a)) or can assert a cause of action based on the Trademark
Dilution Act (Section 43(c)) or can sue under the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) (Section 43(d)), the one part of the
Lanham Act that specifically focuses on domain names. While all of
these statutes can be used, and while some of them require overlapping
showings (use in commerce is required under Sections 32, 43(a), and
43(c)), the differences among them may make one more suitable than
another in certain factual situations.
3. In Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen (p. 124), plaintiff sued under
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act which allows the owner of a famous
mark to assert a cause of action if a defendant’s “commercial use in
commerce of a mark” causes dilution. The court found commercial use by
defendant’s registering and offering to sell domain names to the
trademark owners. The court refused to find commercial use based solely
on registering a domain name. Dilution, as currently defined in the
Dilution Act as amended, is limited to dilution by blurring or
tarnishment. Blurring occurs when the mark has lost “its ability to
serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiff’s product” as the result
of the defendant’s use of the mark. “Tarnishment occurs when a famous
mark is improperly associated with an inferior or offensive product or
service.”
4. In Planned Parenthood v. Bucci (p. 133), the plaintiff asserted
claims under Sections 32, 43(a), and 43(c). The court found a
commercial use because the defendant used the website
plannedparenthood.com to promote a book and to solicit funds as well as
to harm plaintiff commercially. The court also found a likelihood of
confusion applying the Polaroid factors as required under Sections 32
and 43(a). The likelihood of confusion analysis particularly focused on
the fact that the trademark and the domain name were almost identical
and there was evidence of actual confusion. The court rejected a parody
defense which requires “two simultaneous –and contradictory– messages:
that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is
intended as a parody.” The court found no simultaneous dual message.
The court also rejected a First Amendment defense. The court concluded
there could be First Amendment protection for a domain name only when
it conveys a communicative message separate from the use of plaintiff’s
trademark. The court found that defendant’s use of
plannedparenthood.com did not contain a communicative message.
5. A similar First Amendment defense was raised in Taylor Building
Corp. v. Benfield (p. 141) where the defendant registered the gripe
site TaylorHomes-Ripoff.com. The court, in dismissing a Section 43(a)
lawsuit, did not decide the case based on the First Amendment defense
because it concluded, in the alternative, that plaintiff was not making
commercial use of the trademark since the site was only used to publish
complaints about the builder or, if the use was commercial because it
was intended to discourage the builder’s potential customers from
hiring Taylor Homes, there was no likelihood of confusion because no
one would think Taylor Homes was using a domain name called
TaylorHomes-Ripoff.com. Despite not reaching the First Amendment issue,
it is likely a court would find that TaylorHomes-Ripoff.com had
communicative content separate from the Taylor Homes trademark. Courts
have generally permitted the registration of gripe site domain names in
order to engage in cybergriping despite the fact that the domain name
includes a trademark.
6. In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Doughney
(p. 144), after conceding there was a likelihood of confusion between
plaintiff’s PETA trademark and Doughney’s peta.org domain name, the
defendant relied on the parody defense. A parody is a “simple form of
entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of
the trademark with the idealized image created by the mark’s owner.” As
described in Paragraph 4 above, it must “convey two simultaneous--and
contradictory--messages: that it is the original, but also that it is
not the original and is instead a parody.” The court ruled against the
defense because the defendant’s domain name itself, peta.org, did not
convey the kind of second contradictory message needed for a parody,
but was instead merely identical to plaintiff’s trademark. Defendant
tried to argue that the second message appeared in the content of his
website, but the court rejected this argument because it concluded that
the two messages were not conveyed simultaneously. The second message
wasn’t conveyed by the domain name, but only when a viewer visited the
defendant’s website.
7. The plaintiff in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney also brought suit under the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA). The ACPA was enacted to address the behavior of
cybersquatters who register existing trademarks as domain names in
situations where they believe they will be able profitably to sell the
domain name to the trademark holder. The elements of an ACPA cause of
action include showing that the defendant had a bad faith intent to
profit from using the domain name, and that the domain name is
identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive or famous mark. In
PETA v. Doughney, the court found bad faith because the defendant had
offered to sell the domain name to plaintiff and also found that PETA
and peta.org were confusingly similar. The court rejected an argument
that defendant was entitled to the protections of the safe harbor
provision in the act which precludes a finding of bad faith if
“the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use
of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful” (p. 132)
because Doughney had no reasonable grounds to believe that his use of
the mark was permissible. Another ACPA claim was considered in Weather
Underground, Inc. v. NCS, Inc. (page 149). In that case, the defendant
engaged in typosquatting, registering multiple domain names that are
common misspellings of the plaintiff’s trademark. The court refused to
grant summary judgment for the plaintiff because it was required to
show that each of the 288 domain names at issue were confusingly
similar to its trademarked names and because the court concluded there
was a genuine dispute as to a material fact on whether the defendant
acted with a bad faith intent to profit. Nevertheless, the court made
clear that plaintiff was likely to succeed in showing bad faith, based
on the nonexclusive list of 9 factors in the statute (pages 131-32),
because defendant had registered multiple similar names (factor 8) and
there were no reasonable grounds for its actions (good faith reasons
such as a history of legitimate use of the domain name for the offering
of goods or services - factor 3).
8. The ACPA also permits an in rem action to be brought. Under the in
rem provisions, the property used as the basis for in rem jurisdiction
is the disputed domain name and the domain name is viewed as located
where either the domain name registrar or the registry is located. This
basis for jurisdiction is only available if the plaintiff is not able
to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the defendant or cannot locate
the defendant (p. 132). Moreover, the only remedies available under the
in rem provisions of the statute are an order for forfeiture or
cancellation of the domain name or transfer of the domain name to the
trademark owner. Because the registries for a number of popular higher
level domain names (e.g., .com, .net, .org, and .edu) are located
within the United States, the in rem provisions of the ACPA are useful
in the vast majority of domain name disputes where the name at issued
was registered by a foreign national through a foreign registrar.
9. In AOL, Inc. v. AOL.org (p. 152), the court applied the in rem
jurisdiction provisions of the ACPA to a .org domain name originally
registered by a South Korean entity (later transferred to an individual
residing in South Korea) using a Chinese registrar (later transferred
to a South Korean registrar). In rem jurisdiction in the Eastern
District of Virginia was based on the fact that PIR, the .org domain
name registry, was located there. The court concluded that the
requirements for in rem jurisdiction under the act were satisfied
because in personam jurisdiction over the registrant of the domain name
was not available. In the case, a dispute arose over the power of the
registry (as opposed to the registrar) to unilaterally transfer a
domain name registration. AOL requested this relief after the foreign
registrar refused to transfer the name to AOL. Despite the fact that
the contract between the registry and ICANN (the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers), a private not-for-profit corporation
that administers the domain name system (under contract with the U.S.
Department of Commerce), does not authorize the registry to execute
such a transfer (although it is permitted to disable a domain name and
render it inactive), the court granted the relief. It concluded that
the ACPA authorizes such relief, it is within the technical ability of
the registry, and the private contractual arrangements that ICANN makes
with registrars and registries are not limits on the relief available
under the statute. While the court rejected the argument in the AOL
case, in some circumstances assertions of international comity
principles may limit the availability of such relief.
B. The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy
1. In addition to the provisions of the Lanham Act, domain
name/trademark disputes can also be resolved using the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP) of ICANN, a system of online arbitration to
resolve domain name disputes. That policy is incorporated by accredited
domain name registrars into their domain name registration agreements.
Therefore, domain name registrants are obligated to submit to the UDRP
arbitration process if a complaint is filed against them by a trademark
holder. The procedure is merely an option for trademark holders who are
free to go to court instead. However, the procedure has advantages that
make it a preferred choice for many trademark owners. The procedure is
much cheaper and quicker to use than litigation. However, the UDRP
limits the available remedy to the cancellation and transfer of the
domain name’s registration. Moreover, it is not designed to litigate
conflicts over who is the rightful owner of a trademark. Under the
procedure, a registrant of a domain name must submit to an arbitration
procedure before an ICANN approved dispute resolution provider. In this
proceeding, the complainant must show (1) the domain name is identical
or confusingly similar to the complainant’s trademark; (2) the
respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name and
(3) the domain name is being used in bad faith. Defenses under this
procedure include the fact that the respondent is using the domain name
in connection with offering goods or services; the respondent has been
commonly known by the domain name, or the respondent is making a
legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name. These
standards are similar, but not identical to the provisions of the ACPA.
However, the UDRP, as an international procedure, does not incorporate
the First Amendment into its standards. There is a possibility that a
decision in favor of a trademark owner in such a case might conflict
with the First Amendment rights of a domain name registrant based on
the communicative content of the domain name of which the trademark is
only a part.
2. If the domain name registrant loses in an UDRP arbitration, the
domain name registrant has 10 days to file an action in a court with
jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the jurisdiction where the registrar
is located to halt the transfer of the domain name. Such a proceeding
can be brought under the ACPA which provides registrants with a “cause
of action to recover domain names lost in UDRP proceedings.” (p. 183).
If the complainant trademark owner loses, the complainant can file a
Lanham Act suit as long as there is no bar from the statute of
limitations to enforce trademark rights. Since the UDRP arbitration
procedure does not preclude subsequent litigation, and is not mandatory
for trademark owners, the court in Dluhos v. Strasberg (p. 179) found
that a dispute resolved under the UDRP is not entitled to the
deferential standard of judicial review used under the Federal
Arbitration Act. Instead, a federal court hearing a Lanham Act case
brought by the losing party in a UDRP arbitration ignores the prior
arbitration procedure and treats the dispute as though there was no
previous adjudication of the issues raised.
C. Keyword Buying
1. A number of trademark disputes have been brought by trademark owners
asserting that their trademarks were impermissibly used to trigger
online advertisements by competitors. This practice is often referred
to as keyword buying. In 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. (p.
183), 1-800 Contacts complained that WhenU was infringing its trademark
by causing pop-up ads of Vision Direct, one of its competitors, to
appear when a user of WhenU software accessed 1-800's website. The
Second Circuit ordered the district court to dismiss the trademark
infringement claims finding that the defendant did not “use”
plaintiff’s trademark as required by the Lanham Act. This was based on
the fact that (1) trademarks were used internally by the WhenU software
in its SaveNow directory, but there was no visual display of
trademarks, (2) WhenU clients were not able to purchase specified
keywords (including trademarks) that would trigger their ads, and (3)
the pop-up ads did not include 1-800's trademark and did not affect the
appearance of 1-800's website. The court analogized the pop-ups
appearing in close proximity to 1-800's website to “‘product placement’
in retail stores precisely to capitalize on the competitors’ name
recognition,” (p. 188), a practice that did not violate the Lanham Act.
While not deciding the question of whether the ads created a likelihood
of confusion, the court commented that the claim was “incredulous.”
2. The Second Circuit revisited the issue of keywords in Rescuecom
Corp. v. Google, Inc. (p. 190). In this case, the Second Circuit
refused to dismiss the claims and allowed the case to continue. In
reversing the district court’s decision that there was no use in
commerce, the court distinguished its earlier decision in the 1-800
Contacts case on two grounds: the defendant used the plaintiff’s
trademark as a keyword rather than its website address, and (2) Google
recommends, “displays, offers, and sells Rescuecom’s mark to Google’s
advertising customers.” The Second Circuit decision does not mean that
Rescuecom will ultimately win the case because on remand the plaintiff
will have to prove likelihood of confusion results from the display of
competitor ads on a page of search results. The decision appears to be
motivated by the fear that if a court were to find no use in commerce,
Google would be free to display competitor ads in ways that would
deceive the consumer. By contrast, if the case turns on likelihood of
confusion rather than use in commerce, deceptive displays that create
confusion will be discouraged.
IV. The First Amendment and Censorship of Internet Content (Chapter 4)
A. Sexually Explicit Speech
1. In First Amendment analysis, the key component is often the standard
of review applied by a court to examine the constitutionality of a law.
The standard may be determined in a number of different ways. One
method focuses on the nature of the speech being regulated. Some
categories of speech, including obscenity and child pornography,
receive no First Amendment protection at all. If the government
regulates such speech and only such speech, the government only needs
to satisfy minimum scrutiny (the law must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest) because no First Amendment interests
are at stake. A second method used to determine the standard of review
focuses on the nature of the regulation. If the government is
regulating speech based on its content then the standard will often be
strict scrutiny (the law must be narrowly tailored (the least
restrictive alternative) to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest). By contrast, if the law regulates speech on a
content-neutral basis (e.g., how loud it is, how large it is), the law
will often be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny review (the law must
be narrowly tailored (not substantially broader than it needs to be) to
accomplish a substantial governmental interest). Because the key to a
successful challenge or defense of a law typically depends on the
standard of review selected, the parties make a significant effort to
convince the court to apply the standard that will make it easiest for
them to win (the government always wants the lowest level of scrutiny
and the challenger always wants the highest level of scrutiny).
2. The first internet free speech case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court was Reno v. ACLU (page 197) in which the Court struck down key
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The statute made it
a federal crime to transmit indecent internet content to a person under
18 as well as to display patently offensive internet content in a
manner available to persons under 18. The statute created an
affirmative defense for persons who restricted access to covered
material by requiring proof of age such as a verified credit card or an
adult identification number or code. In deciding how to analyze the
statute, the Court considered various arguments put forward by the
government for applying intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. It
considered whether to treat the internet like radio and television
broadcasting, a less protected means of communication meriting
intermediate scrutiny review even if the law is content-based. The
Court rejected this argument, finding that the internet is a fully
protected means of communication like newspapers and magazines. It also
considered the relevance of other cases in which regulations of
sexually explicit speech were analyzed using intermediate scrutiny and
rejected the relevance of those cases.
3. In Reno, the CDA was viewed as content-based because it only
regulated a particular type of speech based on its content - patently
offensive and indecent speech. The regulation singled out that type of
speech because it was viewed as harmful to children who viewed the
speech. Therefore, the regulation was aimed at the primary effect of
the speech and not the secondary effect of the speech (unlike in Renton
- p. 202) and there was no justification for using a less rigorous
standard of review. Under the strict scrutiny test, the government must
show it has a compelling interest and that it is protecting that
interest through the use of the least restrictive alternative means
(sometimes referred to as the requirement of narrow tailoring). The
least restrictive means to achieving the compelling goal of protecting
children would be a means that prevents child access while not
infringing on adult access, but such a means is not usually available
as a practical matter in the context of the internet (as in Reno).
Another hallmark of a less restrictive alternative would be one that
allowed adult access to indecent or patently offensive content during
some hours rather than a 24-hour ban, a technique that is not possible
given the nature of the internet.
4. Applying the strict scrutiny test, the Court struck down the
challenged provisions of the CDA on the ground that they were not
narrowly tailored. The Court found that key provisions of the statute
describing the prohibited speech were too vague to be a least
restrictive alternative and to serve as the basis for the imposition of
criminal penalties. In addition, the affirmative defenses based on age
verification were found to be unduly burdensome on adult users and too
expensive for some website operators. The Court considered filtering
software installed by parents on their computers to be an equally
effective less restrictive alternative means of protecting children.
5. A subsequent version of the CDA, the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA) (p. 219), has also come before the Supreme Court. The Court
upheld the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of the statute because it concluded that the district court had not
abused its discretion in finding that the challengers were likely to
succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim. Despite efforts
by Congress to enact a narrower statute than the CDA (COPA defined more
carefully the speech it applied to as speech harmful to minors echoing
the definition of unprotected obscenity to the extent possible, defined
minors as those under 17 rather than those under 18, only applied to
communication for commercial activities, and only applied to the web
rather than other non-web aspects of the internet), the district court
concluded that COPA was likely to be found to be constitutionally
defective because it was not the least restrictive alternative means
available to protect children. This conclusion was based on the fact
that the government was unlikely to be able to show that equally
effective less restrictive alternative means, specifically filtering
software, were unavailable. On remand after the Supreme Court upheld
the grant of the preliminary injunction, the district court struck down
COPA on the merits (finding filtering software to be a less restrictive
alternative means) and that decision was upheld by the Third Circuit.
The Supreme Court then refused to review the case again.
6. As an alternative to direct censorship of internet content, the
government regulates the content of the internet by requiring the
installation of filtering software on computers that access the web in
public schools and public libraries as a condition of receiving certain
kinds of federal funds under the provisions of the Children’s Internet
Protection Act (CIPA). Under CIPA, schools and public libraries are
required to install technology protection measures that protect against
visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography or harmful to
minors. The first two categories of speech governed by CIPA are not
protected by the First Amendment (See pp. 203-04 for the Supreme
Court’s definition of obscenity). Therefore, the constitutional
controversy surrounds filtering to block material that is harmful to
minors, but protected as to adults. In United States v. American
Library Association (p. 210), the Court upheld the constitutionality of
CIPA on its face. A plurality opinion found that CIPA was not an
unconstitutional exercise of the spending power since library
collections were not public forums and public libraries could filter
access to the internet without violating the First Amendment rights of
their patrons even though filtering resulted in both overblocking and
underblocking. Critical concurring opinions by Justices Kennedy and
Breyer focused on the fact that the statute had a procedure whereby
improperly blocked sites could be unblocked at the request of a library
patron, thereby minimizing the burdens imposed on protected speech. The
plurality and dissenting opinions differed on how to characterize
internet filtering in comparison to books in a library. The plurality
analogized filtering to book selection with the library only choosing
to grant access to websites not blocked by the filter. Book selection
decisions cannot be challenged under the First Amendment. The dissent
disagreed and concluded that filtering was more like book removal,
behavior that may violate the First Amendment rights of library patrons
if done for impermissible reasons.
7. Another form of filtering or blocking was utilized in the
Pennsylvania Internet Child Pornography Act. Under that statute, to
enforce the ban on online child pornography (a form of speech
unprotected by the First Amendment), the Pennsylvania Attorney General
could obtain court orders notifying internet service providers of the
existence of online child pornography accessible to Pennsylvania
residents on a particular website and requiring that they disable
access to the website. While the unprotected status of child
pornography would seem to avoid First Amendment problems with the Act,
problems arose in the implementation of the statute. Because of the
methods used by ISPs to block or filter this material, including DNS
filtering and IP filtering, numerous innocent websites were blocked
(over one million) in addition to the 400 targeted by the attorney
general. This occurred because the customers of many web-hosting
services share the same IP address even though they operate unrelated
websites. In Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert (p. 228),
a federal district court struck down the Act as a violation of the
First Amendment. The court concluded that ISPs acted reasonably in
using filtering systems that vastly overblocked because no more
accurate system was currently available. Since the Act blocked
significant amounts of protected expression when implemented, the court
applied the strict scrutiny test to evaluate its constitutionality.
Applying that standard, the court found the statute to be
unconstitutional in light of the severe burden it imposed on protected
expression and the lack of evidence that the law had been effective in
reducing child sexual abuse.
B. The First Amendment Applied to Other Types of Internet Speech
1. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (p. 239), the
Supreme Court struck down a California law that banned the sale of
violent video games to minors. A majority of the Court applied
traditional free speech principles to the law even though it regulated
a new medium of communication. The Court applied strict scrutiny to the
content-based regulation of video games and concluded that the law was
unconstitutional since there were less restrictive alternatives
available (such as an industry rating system that was enforced by most
video game sellers). The Court also concluded that the games were
protected expression even as applied to minors and that violent speech
was not analogous to sexually explicit speech because there was no long
history of the treatment of violence as a free speech outlier as there
was in the case of sexually explicit speech.
2. In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools (p. 245), the court applied
the same test (the Tinker material disruption test) to online speech
created away from school as it applies to speech that occurs at school.
Kowalski and other cases like it raise the issue of whether physical
location, as a limit on the regulatory authority of a public school, is
relevant as applied to the internet. Like most courts, the Kowalski
court concluded that the at school/away from school distinction is much
less relevant as applied to online speech because online speech that
relates to a school and its students can easily reach school and can
cause as great a disruptive impact as speech that occurs at school.
While applying Tinker to online speech, most courts have refused to
allow public schools to rely on the exceptions to the Tinker rule that
allow certain kinds of student speech to be regulated under less
demanding standards.
3. In Ostergren v. Cuccinelli (p. 250), a whistleblower who posted
copies of Virginia land records with Social Security Numbers (SSNs)
that had not been redacted challenged the constitutionality of a law
that prohibited the disclosure of such information. This case pitted
privacy interests against the First Amendment right to publish true
information contained in public records. In analyzing the state law as
applied to the plaintiff’s website, the Fourth Circuit concluded it was
a content-based ban on publication that could only be justified if it
were a narrowly tailored means to accomplish a state interest of the
highest order. While the state had such a state interest in protecting
its residents against identity theft through the use of their SSNs, the
court concluded the means were not narrowly tailored. Instead of
punishing publication, the state could prevent the SSNs from being
included in the publically available land records. It was the state’s
failure to adequately redact the numbers that led to their publication.
The court did not decide whether the First Amendment would protect
publication in a situation where all SSNs had been removed from the
online versions of the land records and the numbers were only available
in the paper records in courthouses throughout the state.
4. The First Amendment protects the right to engage in anonymous
communication. The Supreme Court has recognized such a right outside of
the context of the internet and there is every reason to believe that
such a right will be recognized for online speech as well (subject to
technical limits that allow anonymity to be penetrated). However, the
right to anonymity conflicts with the needs of the judicial process
when an anonymous speaker is sued as a defendant as the result of
online speech or is potentially needed as a witness based on online
content. In these situations, the needs of the judicial process must be
balanced against the First Amendment right to anonymous speech. To
accomplish this balancing, courts have crafted a variety of different
tests. Most of the tests impose a greater burden on a party interested
in discovering the identity of a potential non-party witness by issuing
a subpoena to an internet intermediary (a website operator, for
example) and a lesser burden when a plaintiff seeks to discover the
identity of the defendant. This distinction rests on the fact that a
lawsuit can proceed without a witness, but can’t proceed without a
defendant.
In Doe v. 2TheMart.com (p. 261), the court concluded that it should
consider the following factors before ordering a non-party internet
service provider to provide information concerning the identity of a
subscriber who is a non-party witness to the underlying litigation: (1)
whether the subpoena seeking the information was issued in good faith
and not for any improper purpose, (2) whether the information sought
relates to a core claim or defense, (3) whether the identifying
information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or
defense, and (4) whether information sufficient to establish or
to disprove that claim or defense is unavailable from any other source.
In Solers, Inc. v. John Doe (p.267), in crafting a test to use when
presented with a motion to quash (or to enforce) a subpoena which seeks
the identity of an anonymous defendant, the court considered the
following factors: (1) the plaintiff has adequately pleaded the
elements of the cause of action, (2) reasonable efforts have been made
to notify the anonymous defendant that the complaint has been filed and
the subpoena has been served, (3) the defendant, after receiving
notice, has had a reasonable time to file a motion to quash (even if
the court must delay further proceedings to provide such reasonable
time), (4) the plaintiff has proffered evidence creating a genuine
issue of material fact on each element of the claim that is within its
control, and
(5) the information sought is important to enable the plaintiff to
proceed with the lawsuit. Unlike the test used in 2TheMart.com, the
court in Solers did not require a showing that the plaintiff has
exhausted alternative sources for learning the needed information.
5. In Universal City Studios v. Corley (p. 270), the court addressed
the issue of whether computer code is speech protected by the First
Amendment and concluded that it is speech. Despite the fact that such
speech is not readable by everyone, the court analogized it to
mathematical formulas and musical scores, both of which are considered
to be speech. The issue arose in the context of a First Amendment
challenge to provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act that
allowed a court to enjoin the online publication of decryption code
that could be used to circumvent anti-copying protections on DVDs as
well as linking to other websites that contained decryption programs.
While recognizing that code is speech, the court applied intermediate
rather than strict scrutiny because the statute was aimed at the
functional rather than the communicative aspects of the code: the code
issued commands to machines that would allow circumvention as well as
providing technical information to readers. Under the intermediate
scrutiny test, the injunction was upheld because it was viewed as the
only means available to prevent “instantaneous worldwide distribution
of a decryption code” with its functional ability to provide
unauthorized access to copyrighted materials.
V. Intermediary Liability for Online Content (Chapter 5)
A. Secondary Liability for Defamatory Content
Defamation law has traditionally distinguished between publishers and
distributors. The latter are only liable if they know or have reason to
know of the defamation because they have no editorial control over the
defamatory content. Distributors include libraries, news vendors and
bookstores. Early defamation suits against internet service providers
who made available content, but did not create the content at issue,
raised the issue of the publisher/distributor distinction in the online
context. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. (p. 281) and Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Service Co. (p. 284) utilized the traditional
distinction between publishers and distributers that turned on the
issue of editorial control and knowledge. These cases discouraged ISPs
from editing online content they did not create to avoid publisher
liability.
B. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
1. In reaction to the Stratton Oakmont decision which treated Prodigy
as a publisher because it sought to exercise content control over its
bulletin boards, Congress enacted Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (pp. 289-91). Section 230 provides that interactive
computer services (broadly defined to include “any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server” and thereby extending
beyond ISPs to websites that post content created by others) shall not
be “treated as the publisher or speaker of any information created by
another.” (p. 290). Under Section 230, interactive computer service
providers are immune from liability as publishers for content they
distribute but do not create, whatever knowledge they may have (Zeran
v. AOL, Inc. (p. 291) - no liability even if ISP refuses to remove
defamatory content after receiving notification of the content because
Section 230 bars publisher liability as well as distributor liability
which is a subset of publisher liability), and even if they exercise
editorial control over the information content provider (Blumenthal v.
Drudge - p. 297 - no liability for defamatory content even if content
is provided under a contractual relationship with the content provider
giving the interactive computer service editorial control over content,
and even if the content is heavily promoted by the provider of the
interactive computer service).
2. Section 230 extends its immunity beyond defamation claims to all
claims in which the defendant is treated as a publisher (unless such a
claim is specifically excluded by the statute as in the case of claims
arising under intellectual property law). This can include many other
torts such as negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, etc. It also includes breach of contract
claims so long as the liability at issue is based on actions taken as a
publisher. There are disagreements over whether a claim is based on
treating the defendant as a publisher or not (Compare Schneider v.
Amazon.com, Inc. (p. 302) (finding Section 230 applied to a breach of
contract action based on a failure to remove defamatory content, an
exercise of editorial discretion) with Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (p. 320)
(finding Section 230 did not apply to a cause of action under Section
90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts based on a failure to
fulfill a promise to remove content).
3. Disagreements exist over when an interactive computer service
provider is itself acting as an information content provider and not
just as a service provider. Courts have rejected claims that retaining
the right to edit content or having licensing rights in the content
transforms a computer service provider into an information content
provider. (Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc. (p. 302)). Disagreements exist
over how active a role an interactive computer service provider can
play without becoming an information content provider. In Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc. (p. 305), the Ninth Circuit found that an
internet dating site did not provide content when it provided a series
of drop down menus with numbers of possible choices to assist its
members in creating a dating profile. While the dating service provided
the choices, it was the members who created the content by choosing
items from the drop down menus. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished Carafano in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley
v. Roommates.com, LLC (p. 308), a case asserting state and federal
housing discrimination claims against a roommate matching website. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the website’s posing specific questions to
subscribers during the registration process (sex, family status, and
sexual orientation), requiring that subscribers answer such questions
by making selections from drop-down menus to create a profile, and
using its search engine and email notification system to provide
listings based on these criteria were all instances in which the
website became an information content provider.