SORNA - Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act
Two provisions are challenged:
1) All sex offenders must register and update their registration even
if convicted of state sex offenses and even if they never travel in
interstate commerce. Updates to the registry where an offender
resides must occur within 3 days and are triggered by any name change,
chance of residence (even a local one), change of job (even a local
one) and change of student status (even if local).
(2) Sex offenders who fail to register or update can be punished if
convicted of a federal sex offense or convicted of a state sex offense
and have traveled in interstate commerce.
Hypothetical Problem:
Assume that the constitutionality of SORNA is being reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court. The Court has agreed to consider whether
SORNA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce. What arguments can be made by the federal
government in support of the statute as a constitutional exercise of
the power to regulate interstate commerce and what arguments can be
made by the defendant to argue that the statute exceeds the scope of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce?
A. Arguments made by the federal
government in defense of the statute:
1. SORNA falls within Congress’s power to protect interstate
commerce from threats that are both interstate and intrastate (category
2). The statute protects interstate commerce from being used to
spread the harm of unregistered sex offenders to other states by
punishing sex offenders who have traveled in interstate commerce and
who have failed to register or update their registration.
2. Even if the statute is viewed as falling within category 3
(regulation of local activity that has a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce), it can be upheld on the authority of Raich,
Wickard, and Darby. The statute, in its entirety, is a
comprehensive scheme that addresses a national and not a local problem
- the presence of unregistered sex offenders. The scheme includes
a registration requirement for sex offenders, an enforcement provision
against federal sex offenders as well as sex offenders who have
traveled in interstate commerce, and the creation of a national
database of sex
offenders so it will be easier to track sex offenders across state
lines. The purpose of the comprehensive regulatory scheme is to help
states to track sex offenders who have crossed state lines and keep
track of where they work, live, and go to school. The statute,
like the statute in Darby, is designed to prevent interstate commerce
from being used to spread the evil of unregistered sex offenders to
other states.
3. The statute addresses a problem that states are unable to
regulate on their own and therefore does not intrude on an area of
traditional state regulation. All states have created sex
offender registries to protect their citizens. However, states have no
authority over sex offenders once they leave the state and travel to
another state. This means that interstate commerce is used to spread
the evil of unregistered sex offenders and states are powerless to
correct this problem by themselves. This is exactly the type of
situation where the framers intended Congress to be able to
intervene. The federal government is assisting the states in the
enforcement of registration laws that states are powerless to enforce
on their own. This federal law fills in this gap and imposes an
obligation to update registration information so that sex offenders do
not disappear off the grid and show up in another state where they have
no criminal record and are unregistered.
4. Even if the statute is viewed as the regulation of a local
non-economic activity under Lopez, the statute is still constitutional
because it contains a jurisdictional element. The broad registration
requirement is only enforced against state sex offenders who travel in
interstate commerce. This jurisdictional element links the regulated
behavior directly to interstate commerce. This was the kind of
element that was lacking in Lopez and Morrison.
5. Even if SORNA does not fall within the commerce power, it is
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause as a means to the
end of regulating interstate activity. The interstate activity is
monitoring sex offenders who cross state lines. Requiring registration
of all sex offenders is a means to the end of punishing sex offenders
who cross state lines and fail to update their registration.
B. Arguments by defendant for
unconstitutionality of statute:
1. The statute regulates local activity - the registration of sex
offenders - thus falling with category 3 as described in Lopez.
Moreover, the statute regulates noneconomic local activity, the
presence of unregistered sex offenders or the registration of those
offenders. This activity is not commercial activity. Since
the activity being regulated is local noneconomic activity, the Court
should be vigilant in making sure Congress doesn’t overstep the bounds
of its power.
2. Applying the Lopez factors, in addition to the activity being
noneconomic, the statute contains no specific findings tying the
failure to register to an effect on interstate commerce. The only
links between failure to register and an effect on interstate commerce
are too attenuated because demonstrating a connection relies on the
same kind of attenuated costs of crime or lower economic productivity
arguments that were unsuccessful in Lopez and Morrison. Moreover,
while the statute appears to contain a jurisdictional element, that
element does not effectively limit the reach of congressional power
and, therefore, does not save the statute from being declared
unconstitutional.
3. The enforcement provision is itself constitutionally deficient
because it applies whenever a sex offender travels in interstate
commerce. This is not the kind of jurisdictional element that the
Court in Lopez concluded could save a statute from being
unconstitutional. The requirement does not condition federal
jurisdiction on when or for what purpose the sex
offender travels; whether it is a temporary shopping trip, a vacation,
or to relocate to a new state; or whether it precedes the commission of
a
sex offense or follows it. Accepting this rationale would mean
the government could regulate every aspect of a person’s existence so
long as they once travel in interstate commerce. In Lopez itself,
it would mean that gun possession in a school zone would be
constitutional if the defendant had traveled in interstate commerce
without a gun and for lawful purposes at some point prior to his being
arrested with the gun in a school zone. On this same rationale,
the federal government could regulate the marriage and divorce of
persons who have traveled in interstate commerce. This would in
effect give Congress a limitless authority over noneconomic local
activities, including those traditionally regulated by the states.
4. Registration of sex offenders who commit state crimes is a matter
traditionally left to the states and the Court should be vigilant not
to allow Congress to intrude in this area.
5. SORNA is not the kind of comprehensive regulatory scheme
upheld in Raich. The heart of the scheme is the requirement that all
sex offenders register (whether they are connected to interstate
commerce or not). The only remaining elements of the scheme are
enforcement provisions. No aspect of the statute regulates any
economic activity (unlike in Raich where the statute also regulated the
sale of marijuana) and so the argument that the registration of sex
offenders is part of a class of activities that Congress can regulate
is not available.
6. Even if the enforcement provision is constitutional viewed on
its own because it contains a jurisdictional element, the registration
provision is not constitutional. This is not a comprehensive
scheme where nontraveling sex offenders who fail to register are part
of a class of activities (all sex offenders) Congress can
regulate. Congress has no authority over the larger class of all
sex offenders. The core provision of SORNA is the registration
provision; it is the heart of the statute. The enforcement
provision
just imposes a penalty for nonregistration so the penalty provision
cannot be used to validate an otherwise invalid regulatory
scheme. In addition, the penalty provision punishes violations of
the registration provision. If the registration provision is
unconstitutional, the penalty provision (which depends on a violation
of the registration provision) is also unconstitutional.
7. The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be used to uphold
SORNA. SORNA is not a means adapted to a commerce clause
end. SORNA does not assist in enforcing any regulation of
interstate commercial activities by also regulating its intrastate
equivalent.